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This is north Minneapolis.  In the juror questionnaires you were
asked - all of you were asked, “Is there a place in Minneapolis
where you would prefer not to go?” and most, if not all of you,
said north Minneapolis.  Well, this is north Minneapolis, folks.
This case is north Minneapolis.1
It may be a different lifestyle and different world, but it's a world
where many of the witnesses in this case reside.  It's their reality. .
. .
The witnesses who saw Steven &ix get murdered . . . deserve the
same consideration as any other person, the same standards, the
same rules, the same consideration.  They [may] look different,
they may perhaps sound different.  Their lifestyles may be perhaps
different, it doesn't matter.
For a moment they stepped out of their world where justice is dis-
pensed on the street and came into this courtroom and they put
their trust and they put their faith in this system because it was the
right thing to do . . . .2 
In several recent homicide cases from Minneapolis,
Minnesota, prosecutors have used a particular rhetorical device in
closing argument that suggests to jurors that certain civilian wit-
nesses from North Minneapolis4 live in a different world than the
jurors do and that, therefore, the jurors must consider the witnesses’
unique cultural characteristics when weighing the witnesses’ credi-
bility.5 Defense attorneys have decried these “different world”
arguments.6 The Minnesota Supreme Court has expressed concern
that such arguments could violate a defendant’s right to a fair trial
by insinuating that the defendant is from a different world and by
introducing unnecessary racial or socioeconomic considerations.7
The court expresses genuine due process concerns; however, its
reaction to these arguments reveals a surprising and cumbersome
reluctance to recognize that jurors apply racial and socioeconomic
stereotypes without prompting.8 The court also fails to appreciate
that prosecutors are trying to curb, rather than to invoke, this sort of
prejudicial thinking.9When a prosecutor knows or reasonably sus-
pects that jurors harbor prejudices about witnesses from particular
neighborhoods within a jurisdiction, it seems reasonable for the
prosecutor to address and discourage those prejudices so that jurors
can properly weigh the credibility of the witnesses based on the evi-
dence and courtroom testimony.10 Certainly, the highest goal is to
eliminate prejudice in the courtroom.  However, to achieve this goal
by persuading jurors to move past their prejudices, a prosecutor
may have to alert jurors of these prejudices.  
This article suggests that the “different world” argument
seeks to eliminate jury bias and prejudice. The “different world”
argument may be a reasonable and fair way to emphasize the cred-
ibility of civilian witnesses when prosecutors speak to a jury of cit-
izens from a community of diverse socioeconomics and human
experience.The key for the prosecutor is to appreciate the potential
dangers of making a “different world” argument. The key for the
court is to understand and respect the purpose of such an argument
so that it can provide proper constraints and clear instruction to
attorneys to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial.
This article argues that a prosecutor should be permitted,
during closing argument, to acknowledge the cultural and socio-
economic distinctions that exist between witnesses testifying at a
trial and the jury members of the same trial, for the limited purpose
of arguing that, despite those differences, the witnesses are credible.
However, the prosecutor must refer to evidence in the record and
avoid making insinuations about the defendant’s character.
This article is divided into six sections.  Part II looks at the roles of
the prosecutor, witnesses, and jurors in a criminal trial.11 Part III
provides background information about North Minneapolis and
Hennepin County, Minnesota to illustrate the real and perceived
chasms between North Minneapolis residents and the other resi-
dents of the county where North Minneapolis is located.12 Part IV
discusses four recent Minnesota Supreme Court cases, each of
which addresses a “different world” argument made by a Hennepin
County prosecutor to describe civilian witnesses from North
Minneapolis.13 Part V analyzes the structure of these “different
world” arguments.  It also reviews the court’s treatment of these
arguments in the context of prosecutorial error, several cases in
which the prosecutor erred by improperly aligning himself or her-
self with jurors to the detriment of the criminal defendant, and the
realities of implicit juror bias.14 Part VI suggests what the court
should consider when determining the propriety of a particular “dif-
ferent world” argument.15 Specifically, the court should be con-
cerned with whether the prosecutor is referring to evidence in the
record and whether the prosecutor is making negative insinuations
about the defendant’s character.16
Once a jury is selected and a criminal trial is underway, a
prosecutor’s task is to introduce evidence – almost exclusively
through testimony – that enables jurors to reach the same conclu-
sion that the prosecutor has reached: that the defendant is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.17 Except for serving this maître d'
function, the prosecutor’s role in the outcome of the trial is limit-
ed.18 While the prosecutor certainly shares in the responsibility of
ensuring a fair trial, the prosecutor stands somewhat on the periph-
ery of the jury’s attention. The trial itself is a conversation between
the witnesses and the jurors,19 and the jurors are the sole judges of
credibility.20 Generally, the state’s case succeeds only if the jurors
believe the state’s witnesses to the approximate degree that the
prosecutor believes them.21 Because the prosecutor is prohibited
from vouching for the witnesses or the sufficiency of the evi-
dence,22 the prosecutor relies on the state’s witnesses to appear
believable and to provide the requisite evidence.23 By relying on
witnesses, especially civilian witnesses, the prosecutor faces many
challenges, including finding ways to combat the various methods
defense attorneys use to attack witnesses’ credibility.24 In this con-
text, it is crucial for a prosecutor to utilize her closing argument to
address concerns that jurors may have about the credibility of the
state’s witnesses. The prosecutor must also insulate witnesses from
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potential juror prejudice and bias,  especially when the prosecutor
can anticipate that a witness’ lack of credibility will be a theme in
the defense attorney’s closing argument. There certainly are imper-
missible ways to discuss the credibility of witnesses.   However,
these prohibitions should not prevent the prosecutor from vigorous-
ly arguing that the state’s witnesses are worthy of the jury’s trust.28
In a usual case, a prosecutor is likely to have high confi-
dence in and familiarity with her witnesses and the witnesses will
have credentials that support credibility, such as a high-ranking
police officer.  Most of the state’s witnesses are likely to be govern-
ment employees, e.g. police officers, medical and lab staff, and
medical examiners, and, consequently, the state will have a great
deal of confidence in its witnesses and control over who they will
be.29 Also, the prosecutor is aided by the fact that state-employed
witnesses are typically motivated to testify because testifying is
often viewed as part of their employment responsibilities, if not
their calling, as civil servants.30
In contrast, civilian witnesses such as eyewitnesses to a
crime originate from a different selection process – better known as
“fate” – and may have very disparate levels of motivation.
Compared to the government’s employment process, there is no
selection process for civilian witnesses; there is no voir dire or call
to a central casting agency when a crime occurs.32 A witness might
unexpectedly encounter a drive-by shooting, or could be involved
with a victim or a defendant in a myriad of additional relevant
ways.33 Consequently, as a case develops, a prosecutor may gain
some unexpected bedfellows, and “doing justice” in a particular
case may come down to whether a jury believes an unvetted
stranger whose character, acumen, and level of commitment to the
prosecution are uncontrolled variables.34
The most challenging witness variables faced by the pros-
ecution are likely to be prior felony convictions, prior inconsistent
statements, an unwillingness to speak to police, little-to-no motiva-
tion to testify, and plea bargains that require witnesses to testify.35
The defense often is confronted with challenges related to the lim-
ited language and articulation skills of the defendant during a trial,
but even a government witness who speaks in nonstandard English
or who mumbles may become a liability for the state.36 One might
call these issues “baggage,” but at trial, these credibility indicators
are potential flaws in the state’s case that defense attorneys can
exploit to discredit the state’s witnesses in the eyes of the jury, and
to distract the jury from the defendant’s alleged misdeeds.37
Consequently, success in a strongly-contested trial typically boils
down to the credibility of the witnesses, and that means that the
prosecutor’s case will depend on what factors jurors use to weigh
credibility.28
Any reasonable attorney would be concerned that the fac-
tors used by the jurors are fair and reflect the instructions provided
by the court,39 and any reasonable attorney would want to present
a witness’ “baggage” in as decent light as possible by reminding
jurors that the witness’ life may be far different from the jurors’
lives.40 In recent years, some prosecutors in Hennepin County,
when arguing about witness credibility, have chosen to refer to a
“different world” that witnesses in North Minneapolis inhabit.41
Defense attorneys and the court have raised questions about the pro-
priety of such references and of their potential impact on the jury.
To understand the perspectives of the parties, an appropriate prelim-
inary question is: “What is special or peculiar about North
Minneapolis such that it receives special attention and treatment?”
The geographical boundaries of North Minneapolis can be
defined in several ways: by its thirteen “neighborhoods,”42 its two
“communities,”43 or the boundaries of the Fourth Police Precinct.44
By whatever measure, North Minneapolis is a region of
Minneapolis that sits west and northwest of Downtown
Minneapolis;45 it comprises about one-fifth of the city’s 58.7
square mile land area and is roughly bounded by Interstate 94W on
the east, Interstate 394 on the south, and the city limits on the west
and north.46
In 2000, Minneapolis had a population of 382,618 peo-
ple.47 Its racial composition was 249,618 (65%) white residents,
68,818 (18%) African-American residents, 29,175 (8%) Hispanic
residents, 23,744 (6%) Asian residents, and 8,378 (2%) Native
American residents.48 Figures from 2006 suggest that these figures
have been stable generally.49 North Minneapolis contains 17.5% of
the city’s population50 and a large percentage and high density of
the city’s African-Americans.51 North Minneapolis’s two commu-
nities, Camden and Near North, are among the city’s poorest five
communities, “which have the city’s lowest property values, high-
est percentage of homes in substandard condition, . . . the most
crime[, and e]ighty percent of all African American children . . . .”52
Only 28% of African-American men enrolled in Minneapolis Public
Schools graduate in four years.53 As might be predicted with these
demographics, the per capita income of residents of North
Minneapolis averages roughly half the per capita income of the city
as a whole,54 and the percentage of children eligible for free school
lunch (an indicator of poverty) is much higher in North Minneapolis
than in other regions of the city.55 In fact, 30-50% of residents liv-
ing in many neighborhoods in North Minneapolis live in poverty. 56
Despite the fact that North Minneapolis comprises only
one-fifth of the geographical size of Minneapolis and 17.5% of the
city’s population,57 it accounts for roughly half of the city’s homi-
cides.58 Since 1982, the number of homicides in Minneapolis per
year has fluctuated from eighteen in 1983 to ninety-seven in 1995.59
Of those deaths classified as homicides, North Minneapolis
accounted for twenty-nine (54%) of the fifty-four homicides in
2004, twenty-one (42%) of the fourty-nine homicides in 2005, and
twenty-nine (48%) of the sixty homicides in 2006.60 In 2007,
despite double-digit decreases in violent crime in North
Minneapolis, it still accounted for twenty-seven (57%) of the city's
forty-seven homicides.61 Data also shows that most murders in
Minneapolis involve African-American assailants and African-
American victims,62 and it is not uncommon for media reports to
introduce the racial backgrounds of assailants and victims when dis-
cussing crime in North Minneapolis.63
A commonly-expressed sentiment in the Minnesota media
is that North Minneapolis is a dangerous place where youth and
gang violence runs wild and is the source of most of the violence in
the city.64 Even news articles that otherwise intend to report posi-
tive trends in North Minneapolis assume that its readers negatively
associate the region with crime, citizen complacency, and econom-
ic blight.65 In major national newspapers such as The New York
Times, North Minneapolis has been compared to notorious commu-
nities such as South Los Angeles and Dorchester, Massachusetts as
“[astounding] pockets of crime in this country.”66
Minneapolis is located in Hennepin County along with
forty-five other suburban communities.67 Hennepin County com-
prises the Fourth Judicial District.68 All state felony cases are han-
dled by the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office69 and jurors taken
from general jury pools are comprised of Hennepin County resi-
dents.70 Hennepin County is very large; its area spans over 600
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square miles.71According to the 2000 census, there were 1,116,200
people in the county; the racial makeup of the county was 81%
white, 10% African American, 5% Asian, 4% Hispanic, and 1%
Native American, with the rest consisting of other or multiple
races.72
These demographics have predictable consequences in
terms of socioeconomic status, racial make-up, and exposure to
crime, of the Hennepin County residents who are not from
Minneapolis. The median income for these households in 2000 was
$51,711, over thirty-six percent more than the median income for a
household in Minneapolis and certainly far more than the same fig-
ure for a North Minneapolis household.73 Whereas the percentage
of people living in poverty in Minneapolis is 16.9% and the number
of people in many North Minneapolis neighborhoods living in
poverty is 30-50%, only 3.9% of Hennepin County residents living
outside of Minneapolis are living in poverty.74 Of the 99,943
African-Americans in Hennepin County, only 31,125 (30%) live in
areas outside of Minneapolis,75 and African-Americans comprise
only 5% of the population of Hennepin County cities other than
Minneapolis.76 Hennepin County’s lack of diversity outside of
Minneapolis is made clearer by 2000 U.S. Census figures that
reveal that over 60% of all children in Minneapolis are children of
color whereas less than 20% of all children in Hennepin County
outside of Minneapolis are children of color.77 As for homicides,
according to one figure, Minneapolis accounted for over 83% of the
total number of yearly homicides in Hennepin County.78
Hennepin County prosecutors have the task of prosecuting
defendants from North Minneapolis who are charged with murder.
These trials obviously take place in a historical and social context
in which Hennepin County residents are aware of the negative rep-
utation of North Minneapolis.79 There have been a number of cases
in recent years in which a prosecutor has faced the prospect of rely-
ing on the credibility of civilian witnesses from North Minneapolis.
By taking a look at the facts of these cases in the context of the
above demographic information, it becomes clearer why these pros-
ecutors resorted to “different world” arguments during their closing
arguments.
State v. Ray
i. Facts
On June 13, 1998, around 4:30 PM, Chauncey Teasley was
shot to death near the Parkview Apartments complex, a high-rise at
1201 12th Avenue North in North Minneapolis.80 Police later
found seven shell cases, all fired from the same weapon, one live
bullet several yards from Teasley’s body,81 and a cell phone that
was owned by Secundus Ray.82 Police never found the murder
weapon.83
No more than 1.5 to three minutes before the shooting,
Teasley was standing outside of the Parkview Apartment with his
friend Depring Jackson and Jackson’s sister.84 Jackson lived in the
building, and Teasley went there to visit her with his cousin Howard
Nelson, his cousin “Nobby” Teasley, and Nelson’s infant daugh-
ter.85
While Teasley and Jackson talked, a red Ford Taurus
entered the building’s parking lot. A security guard at the building,
Mitchell Hicks, recognized the vehicle because the two individuals
in the vehicle were friends of Jackson and had been at the building
before.86 The two individuals were later identified as Secundus Ray
and Coley Gates.87When they arrived, Gates and Ray got out of the
Taurus and began to fight with Teasley.88 Gates said to Teasley,
“You remember me; you shot at me back in the day.”89
According to Jackson, Teasley's “eyes got big and he ran.”90
Before he ran, Teasley told his cousins, “I think they're about to get
me” and “[t]hat's the dude CK [Gates] I got into it with.”91
Teasley then ran down the sidewalk to a wooded area south
of the apartment.92 Jackson told Teasley's cousins, “just get him
and take him home.”93 Teasley’s cousins took off in their car in
search of Teasley.  Gates and Ray closely followed them in their
car.94 A few moments later, Gates and Ray turned right, toward the
wooded area, and the cousins drove straight.95 Meanwhile,
Jackson and her sister began pursuing Teasley on foot, saw him run-
ning into a field south of the building, and then heard a series of
gunshots.96 Jackson and her sister ran toward the shots, as did the
security guard, Hicks.97 The three of them eventually reached
Teasley, who was lying on the ground, fatally shot.98 Despite the
fact that the murder occurred in broad daylight at 4:30 in the after-
noon, no witness claimed to have seen the actual shooting.99
The police investigation into the murder was complicated
by conflicting identifications and witnesses’ accounts.100 For exam-
ple, Ms. Jackson initially told police and the grand jury that she did
not know the individuals in the Taurus and that she was not at the
crime scene.101 Only after being confronted with video evidence
that indicated that she was present, did she admit that the individu-
als were Gates and Ray.102 Ms. Jackson rationalized her lack of
candor by stating, “Sergeant Violette, you don't understand, you're
white. You don't live in this neighborhood. You don't have to see
these people after you've talked to them.  And I do.”103
Additionally, Jackson’s sister did not initially identify Ray,
though she later picked him out of a photo lineup.104 The security
guard, Hicks, could not identify either Gates or Ray in lineup pho-
tos,105 though he claimed that he had recognized the individuals
who were in the Taurus.106 Two nearby residents claimed that they
saw a man running from the scene of the shooting, but their descrip-
tions of the man’s clothing and his height were inconsistent and
changed over time.107 Also, individuals who claimed to have heard
gunshots had inconsistent accounts about the number of shots
fired.108
Ray was indicted by a grand jury for first-degree murder
on October 27, 1998.109 He later was arrested in Chicago.110
During a police interview in Chicago on November 9, 1998, Ray
initially denied being present at the apartment building but later
admitted being present, though he denied any involvement in the
shooting.111 He was subsequently tried and convicted of first degree
murder.112
ii. The Prosecutor’s “Different World” Argument
During his closing argument, the prosecutor addressed the
inconsistent statements made by witnesses, particularly Depring
Jackson, and the fact that some witnesses did not come forward ini-
tially to explain what they knew about the murder of Teasley.113 The
prosecutor invited the jury to put the evidence “in context, particu-
larly the type of people that presented this evidence . . . .”114 The
prosecutor argued that the lack of immediate candor by witnesses
was due either to the greater amount of violence present in areas of
North Minneapolis or an understandable fear of the reprisal that
witnesses anticipated if they would have come forward and cooper-
ated with the police.   Noting that the murder occurred “in broad
daylight, on a Saturday afternoon, near a busy high rise in North
Minneapolis,”116 the prosecutor stated:
I would suggest that if this happened in a lot of other 
neighborhoods, say in Golden Valley, or Edina, or 
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Minnetonka . . . the reaction of the citizenry . . . would be
a whole lot different from the reaction of the people in 
NorthMinneapolis. Their reaction basically takes one of 
two forms. One form, they don't want to be involved. 
Why? For one of two reasons, either they don't care, 
they're apathetic or they fear reprisals.  I would suggest 
that if this happened in a neighborhood in Edina, people .
. . couldn't get to the phone fast enough to tell the police 
what they saw . . . to insure [sic] that this kind of conduct
would never happen in their neighborhood ever again.  
But this is a different environment . . . and it's a challenge
for you, because it's not in an environment that most, if 
not all of you people, are familiar with.
This is not a dispute between a businessman or a busi-
nesswoman from Edina and another businessman or busi
nesswoman from Minnetonka. This is a dispute . . . 
involving three young black males in the hood in North 
Minneapolis. This is not your environment, this is the 
Defendant's environment. So it's a challenge to you to 
remove yourself from your environment and look at this 
case and these witnesses in the context of the environ
ment that they come from.117
The prosecutor continued by stating: 
The challenge here is for you not to judge the witnesses 
because they are the product of the same environment 
that they share with the Defendant. The challenge here is 
for you to judge their testimony in spite of the fact that 
they come from this environment. It's real easy, you see, 
folks, to dismiss people just because they're different 
from us, because they come from a different walk of life. 
It's really easy to say, well, that will never happen in my 
neighborhood so why should I care? ... This system is 
designed to do justice and that's what we are asking you 
to do, to do justice.118
The prosecutor also sought to bolster the credibility of Howard
Nelson, the victim’s cousin, by acknowledging that Nelson had a
criminal background but arguing that the jury should not dismiss his
testimony based solely on his prior convictions.119 The prosecutor
argued:
Really, other than that, nothing Howard Nelson said was 
really particularly damaging to this defendant.  He does-
n't identify him.  He doesn't positively say this person 
right here was the person who was with Colie Gates, so 
what relevance is it that it was brought out that he has a 
criminal background?  
The defense brings that out because they want you to dis-
miss him. The more you despise someone, the easier it is 
to dismiss them.  But would that be fair and just in this 
case?  It's up you to decide this, folks, but you need to ask
yourselves that what relevance is there to the testimony 
that Howard Nelson presented that he has a criminal back
ground, and what a surprise when you think about this 
environment, when you think about where this crime took
place. What a surprise that somebody has got some crimi-
nal conviction.120
iii. The Defendant’s Claim and the Result on Appeal
Among the claims made on appeal, the defendant argued
that the prosecutor erred during closing argument by suggesting that
“the jury should judge [the defendant] and many of the witnesses
differently because they came from a different environment.”121
The defendant contended that this argument made “the implicit sug-
gestion that it was appropriate to apply racial considerations to Ray
and to the crime.”122 The defendant also claimed that the prosecu-
tor's closing argument was “an attempt to supply a ‘race-based’
explanation for the states' witnesses and to imply that racial consid-
erations were appropriate in considering [his] fate.”123 The court
addressed the defendant’s misconduct claim in spite of the fact that
it had already decided to reverse on other grounds, “to provide guid-
ance to the district court should the state engage in similar conduct
in the new trial.”124
The court acknowledged that “‘the propriety of a prosecu-
tor’s final argument is a matter within the sound discretion of the
trial court’”125 and noted that defense counsel did not object to the
state’s closing argument.126 However, the court found the prosecu-
tor’s comments very problematic: 
In cases where race should be irrelevant, racial . . . con-
siderations, in particular, can affect a juror's impartiality 
and must be removed from courtroom proceedings to the 
fullest extent possible . . . . Above all, demeaning refer-
ences to racial groups compromise the right to a fair trial 
by inviting jurors to view a defendant as coming from a 
different community than themselves.  Here, the prosecu-
tor invited the jurors to view the entire occurrence as 
involving three young black males in the hood in North 
Minneapolis, a world wholly outside their own. Such an 
invitation asks the jury to apply racial and socio-econom-
ic considerations that would deny a defendant a fair trial. 
Such an invitation must be avoided in the new trial.127
The court focused on the particular phrases of the prosecutor’s argu-
ment that identified the defendant and witnesses as black men from
North Minneapolis, but, surprisingly, the court did not address how
the prosecutor’s insistence that the jurors should not judge the wit-
nesses based on their environment affected the jurors.128
State v. Clifton
i. Facts
On September 23, 2002, at around 7:00 p.m., Steven Nix
was “hanging out,” smoking marijuana, and drinking alcohol with
his friends Darryl Neal and Calvin Combs in Neal’s SUV on a res-
idential street in the Tangletown neighborhood in North
Minneapolis.129 Seemingly out of nowhere, Brian Clifton walked
up to the GMC Jimmy and shot Nix in the head from two or three
feet away.130 Clifton tried to shoot again, but the gun jammed.131
Neal immediately drove Nix to North Memorial Hospital, but the
bullet had fatally lacerated Nix’s brain.132 Just before the shooting,
Clifton’s cousin Claudell Walker was in the area, and he witnessed
Clifton walk up to the SUV and shoot Nix in the head.133
Neal later identified Clifton from a photo display, stating
“[t]hat’s him, that’s your shooter.”134With Neal’s assistance, police
eventually were able to locate Walker and Combs, both of whom
identified Clifton as the shooter.135
Through their investigation, police learned that Nix and
Clifton had a dramatic history with each other.136 In February 2002,
Nix was charged with the attempted murder of Clifton’s brother at
a party in North Minneapolis.137 Following a June 2002 jury trial,
Nix was acquitted.138 On the day the jury returned the verdict in
Nix’s trial:
Clifton and his family met with the Nix trial prosecutor 
and victim advocate outside the courtroom.  Clifton was 
very angry. As the prosecutor explained that the criminal 
case was over, Clifton made some comments, the gist of 
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which was that “this could be taken care of some other 
way.”  Clifton was also overheard swearing that he was 
“going to kill” or “get” Nix.139
Police also learned that, throughout the summer of 2002, when
Clifton crossed paths with Nix in their North Minneapolis neighbor-
hood, Clifton made “threatening gestures towards Nix.”140
On the strength of this evidence, Clifton was indicted,
tried, and ultimately convicted of first-degree premeditated mur-
der.141
ii. Prosecutor’s “Different World” Argument
In her closing argument, the prosecutor acknowledged that
there could be differences in background and lifestyle between the
jurors, the victim, and the state’s witnesses, but argued that all of the
witnesses deserve the jurors’ equal respect:
In preparing these remarks I thought about you as jurors 
and how different your lives may be from the lives and 
the lifestyles of many of the people who testified before 
you and from the victim, Steven Nix.
And how could you transport yourself to the world of the
streets in Tangletown, a world where people gather on the
neighborhood block and hang out. They look for action.  
They recognize people by sight, know them only by nick
name, [do] a little drinking, find some marijuana, smoke 
a little marijuana, see who is partying, see who's hanging.
I'm not saying that that's the life of everybody in that 
area, of course.  But there are some folks who do go 
there and hang out.
It's a world, at least to some extent, where some people 
don't trust the system and don't call the police when they 
see somebody with a gun. They don't run from trouble 
but almost seem to flirt with it or at least co-exist with it. 
. . .It may be a different lifestyle and different world, but 
it's a world where many of the witnesses in this case 
reside.  It's their reality . . . .142
Our laws, ladies and gentlemen, are not different for dif-
ferent people. They're uniform.  It doesn't matter who you
are, it doesn't matter your lifestyle, it doesn't matter your 
race, your gender, your sexual orientation. That doesn't 
matter. All of us are entitled to the full protection of the 
law. It doesn't matter what kind of a life you led either.  
No matter how he led his life, Steven Nix's murder 
deserves to be investigated and his murder deserves to be
prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. The witnesses 
who saw Steven Nix get murdered and came into the 
courtroom to tell you what they saw and what they heard,
they deserve the same consideration as any other person, 
the same standards, the same rules, the same considera-
tion. They may look different, they may perhaps sound 
different. Their lifestyles may be perhaps different, it 
doesn't matter.143
For a moment they stepped out of their world where jus-
tice is dispensed on the street and came into this courtroom
and they put their trust and they put their faith in this sys-
tem because it was the right thing to do . . . .144
There were three eyewitnesses who saw the defendant 
kill Mr. Nix, Darryl Neal, nicknamed Dee Dee or Little 
One; Mr. Combs, Calvin, Mr. Walker, Cheese. These are 
people who live and work and hang ‘out in that particular
area. They are the witnesses who were there that night.  
They are the witnesses who saw what happened.145
You know, it would be nice when you're preparing a case 
for trial, if you were able to call up a movie studio and 
call up central casting and say, “Say, I need a couple of 
witnesses for my trial and could there be a nun and could
there be a firefighter and maybe a minister? Could you 
throw in some people that would be just so believable by 
who they are?” But that's not reality.
The reality is you have to go to the people who are there 
at the time, who saw what they saw. Those are the people
who are your witnesses, the people who were at this inci-
dent.
They may have different lifestyles and perhaps some
times different ways of phrasing things and perhaps dif-
ferent reactions to events that some of you may have.146
However, -- and maybe different communication styles 
when they're in here as well testifying.  But we are all 
members of the same community. We live in the same 
area, we have the same laws, we have the same courts, 
they are a part of us, and we are a part of them.147
So they came to the police in three different ways and 
there are three people who stepped out of their world, the
world of perhaps street justice, if you will, and came in 
here and decided to participate in the system. Three peo-
ple who showed by their actions in this case that they 
want the violence to stop.148
iii. The Defendant’s Claim and the Result on Appeal
After he was convicted, one of Clifton’s claims on appeal
was that the prosecutor’s above-quoted remarks constituted prose-
cutorial error.149 Clifton alleged that the state “improperly incited
jurors to view [Clifton] as coming from a different community than
they did and to insert racial and socio-economic differences into a
case where such considerations were irrelevant.”150 Clifton argued
that that the state’s closing argument involved setting up an “our
versus “their” community mentality for the purposes of inciting
jurors to view Clifton as coming from a different community.151
The court reviewed the prosecutor’s closing argument and
held that the above-quoted remarks were improper in at least three
respects.  “First, the remarks bordered on injecting issues broader
than the guilt or innocence of the accused.  Second, the remarks
came close to appealing to passion and prejudice. Third and more
importantly, these remarks were demeaning.” The Court repeated
the mantra found in Ray: “‘Above all, demeaning references to
racial groups compromise the right to a fair trial by inviting the
jurors to review a defendant as coming from a different community
than themselves.’”153 The court also pointed to the prosecutor’s fail-
ure to heed the Ray holding:
Our decision in Ray was filed on April 17, 2003. Trial in 
the instant case commenced on September 8, 2003. The 
record reflects that the parties were aware of the Ray
decision and, in fact, the court made evidentiary rulings 
in line with Ray. So it is with some dismay that we are 
looking at the same kind of closing argument out of the 
same county attorney's office, but one in which defense 
counsel acquiesced.154
The court explained that it did not matter that the closing argument
was not “calculated to cause the jury to decide the case on the basis
of passion or prejudice rather than reason.”155 “Where race is irrel-
evant, ‘racial considerations, in particular, can affect a juror’s
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impartiality and must be removed from courtroom proceedings to
the fullest extent possible.’”156 Despite its obvious disapproval, the
court decided that the interests of justice did not demand a new trial
“where unlike Ray, there was no explicit reference to race or use of
race to disparage the defendant, the argument had a basis in the
record, and Clifton otherwise received a fair trial . . . .”157 Here the
court did not discuss what conclusions the jurors could have made
on their own based on the trial evidence in the absence of the pros-
ecutor’s remarks, and did not consider the prosecutor’s statements
within the context of the prosecutor’s request that jurors provide the
witnesses equal consideration and consider them a part of the
jurors’ community.158
State v. Paul
i.Facts
Late in the morning on November 7, 2002, Fred
Williamson was shot and killed as he was riding with two friends,
Bryan Herron and Antonio Wilson, in Herron’s car after eating
breakfast at a North Minneapolis café.159 According to Herron and
Wilson, a black truck pulled up on the passenger side of the car and
the driver of the truck fired shots into the car, one of which hit
Williamson below the right armpit, eventually killing him.160
Herron and Wilson later testified that they thought the black truck
was the same vehicle they had seen Leroy Paul in as he exited the
café, and Wilson testified that, although he did not see who the
shooter was, he was a “hundred percent” certain that Paul was the
shooter.161
Williamson, Herron, and Wilson encountered Paul and his
girlfriend Kesha Dent at the café just as they were leaving and Paul
was arriving in a black SUV owned by his friend Kenneth
Spencer.162 Paul, Williamson, and Herron had been friends for
years, but Paul and Williamson recently had a “falling out.”163
At the café, Williamson approached Paul, and they got into a con-
frontation in which Paul “drew a .40 caliber gun out of the waist-
band of his pants, put a bullet in the chamber, and then put the gun
at his side, but did not point it at anyone.”164 Wilson later claimed
that he did not see Paul with a gun during this confrontation, and
Dent stated that, instead of witnessing the confrontation, she walked
into the café and ordered food for herself and Paul.165After the con-
frontation, Williamson left with Herron and Wilson, and
Williamson soon retrieved a nine millimeter gun from under the
front seat and loaded it.166 Herron and Wilson took the gun away
from Williamson and unloaded it.167 Williamson was later shot.168
Herron brought Williamson to the hospital after he was
shot, dropped him off at the emergency room, and fled the scene.169
Police obtained a description of Herron from hospital staff, pursued
him, and later found him walking in traffic a block away from the
hospital.170 When speaking to police, Herron acknowledged being
with Williamson, but failed to mention that Wilson was there as
well.  He also claimed he could not recall the name of the café, but
described the shooter’s vehicle as being “gray” and “possibly a
van,” and stated that he had “no information on the shooter.”171 In
short, the victim’s friend lied to the police about facts police could
have used to solve the case.
Police gathered forensic evidence that confirmed that
Williamson was shot with .40 caliber ammunition while riding in
Herron’s car.172 Police visited Williamson’s family and parole and
probation officers, but they could not locate cooperative witness-
es.173After a year of investigating the shooting, in November 2003,
a new investigator was assigned to the case.174 In January 2004, the
investigator re-interviewed Herron, who was being held in federal
custody in connection with drug and firearm charges.175 Eventually,
Herron made a plea arrangement on the federal charges that
required him to provide “substantial assistance” to the Williamson
murder investigation.176 The investigator gained new information
from interviews with Herron, Dent, Wilson, and Spencer in
February 2004, and he was able to interview Paul in March 2004.177
During this interview, Paul denied shooting Williamson, 
denied knowing Williamson well, denied knowing 
Williamson's nickname, denied ever going to the café 
with Dent, denied ever riding in Spencer's truck with 
Dent, identified certain photographs of people related to 
the investigation, and indicated that he was unable to 
definitively identify people in other photographs-includ-
ing Williamson.178
On March 17, 2004, the state charged Paul with Williamson's mur-
der, and Paul was indicted on charges of first-degree premeditated
murder and first-degree felony murder while committing a drive-by
shooting.179 At Paul’s trial, which began on January 18, 2005, the
State’s witnesses provided complicated and often-contradicted tes-
timony about their whereabouts on the morning of the murder.180
As the Minnesota Supreme Court summarized: 
Dent testified that while they were outside the café, Paul 
asked her to go inside to order their food, and then he 
left, saying that he would be “right back.”  Dent testified 
that Paul did not return, and Spencer picked her up at the 
café.  But Spencer indicated on cross examination that he
did not pick up Dent at the café that day.  Dent further 
testified that she met Paul at a home in north 
Minneapolis, and Dent and Paul then drove in Dent's car 
to their Apple Valley apartment.  Dent testified that Paul 
told her that day “that Fred had shot at him, and he had 
shot back at him, and it was self-defense.”   She also tes-
tified that Paul told her to tell the police “that [Paul] was 
with me. He didn't leave out of my eyesight.” Spencer 
testified that when he saw Paul around 12:15 p.m. on 
November 7, Paul told him that “he thought he killed 
Fred.”  Spencer testified that he “started tripping out” 
upon hearing this statement and asked Paul what he had 
done to Williamson.  Paul then responded that he had not 
done anything. 181
Despite the contradictions of the witnesses and their lack of coop-
eration, the jury found Paul guilty of first-degree felony murder and
second-degree murder.182
ii. The Prosecutor’s “Different World” Argument
The prosecutor began her closing argument with the fol-
lowing comments:
This is my opportunity to welcome you to the real world.
What you've seen in the last few days is a world where 
an argument is sometimes settled with a gun. A world 
where a young man gets killed in broad daylight while 
he's sitting in a car. A world where his friends and other 
acquaintances won't tell the authorities what really hap-
pened until more than a year later. A world where a fam
ily has to wait for over a year to find out that something's
going to happen about their son's death.  Now during jury
selection, I told you that you might hear about-from peo-
ple that you don't like; people who's [sic] lifestyles you 
don't agree with, aren't familiar with. You've now been 
introduced to all of that, haven't you?
It certainly wasn't easy for [Herron] to be here. This is 
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part of the real world that I talked about.  Part of our 
community that doesn't trust the police.
Ladies and gentlemen, in these kind [sic] of cases, a case 
where there's [sic] people who have relationships with a 
defendant, relationships to a defendant, in this real world 
I've described to you, sometimes people don't want to get
involved. And these aren't people who keep journals, 
these aren't people who write a diary, they're not people 
who may remember absolutely everything, and I don't 
mean to be disparaging in saying that, but you realize that
some of these people live in a very different world, and 
their memories may not be perfect, but they came in here 
and told you what it was that they saw happened.183
iii. The Defendant’s Claim and the Result on Appeal 
The defendant claimed that the above-quoted remarks con-
stituted unobjected-to prosecutorial error, arguing that “the [state]
subtly injected racial issues and distinguished between the jurors'
world and the world of the Defendant, victim, and witnesses”184
and that, by contrasting the jury’s world to “their world,” the state
“impermissibly invited the jury to take into account racial and/or
socio-economic considerations.”185 The court disagreed, conclud-
ing that the remarks,
did not rise to the level of misconduct because the 
remarks were brief; the jury was not expressly invited to 
compare their own ‘world’ with the “real world” 
described; the remarks summarized the evidence in the 
case; the remarks were not demeaning; there was no 
mention of race, culture, neighborhoods, or any particular
community; and the remarks were apparently intended to 
address inconsistencies and the lack of cooperation by 
witnesses-which were a focus of the defense case-rather 
than to appeal to the passions of the jury.186
However, the court reviewed its holdings in Ray and Clifton and
made clear that it did not approve of these types of arguments: 
Although we find no error here, we take this opportunity 
to remind attorneys and district courts of the concerns we
raised in Clifton and Ray, and encourage attorneys to 
refrain from using concepts and terms such as different 
“worlds” or “these people” to refer to the people inti-
mately involved in the case. Such imagery may imply 
that the people involved with the case are somehow col-
lectively distinguishable from the jurors on an inappropri-
ate basis. If an attorney intends to convey that certain 
witnesses are credible despite behaving in a way that a 
juror might not understand, we respectfully suggest that 
there are other, more appropriate ways to address this 
concern. Finally, we reaffirm our “strong commitment to 
rooting out bias, no matter how subtle,” and invite all 
attorneys participating in the criminal justice system to 
join this effort.187
State v. Wren
i.Facts
On the afternoon of March 4, 2005, Frank Haynes and
Raleigh Robinson were shot and killed while having lunch at the
Penn Best Steak House in North Minneapolis.188 The two men were
sitting near Antonio Washington and two other men when James
Wren entered the restaurant with a gun, and while talking wildly on
his cell phone, walked up to the table where Washington was seat-
ed, shot at Washington three times, and then ran into the kitchen and
out an emergency exit, still carrying the gun.189Wren’s errant shots
missed Washington and fatally wounded Haynes and Robinson.190
After the shooting, Washington and another man,
Cornelius Branch, followed Wren with a gun.191 Branch fired his
gun several times as they were leaving the restaurant, and then
Washington took the gun and fired two shots at Wren outside of the
restaurant.  None of the bullets hit Wren and he ran around the cor-
ner of the building and down an alley.192 Wren got to his car and
drove away from the scene.  He eventually arrived at a house where
two of his acquaintances, A.J. and Teda Ayler, observed Wren with
the gun and heard him say that he was going to stash it in the base-
ment.193 Ms. Ayler told police that she heard Wren say that he “just
got into it with the niggers who shot [his] brother” and “I need to
get out of here.”  She later denied this statement and the state
impeached her for contradicting her prior statement.194
The murder investigation quickly focused on Wren after
police learned that there was considerable tension between
Washington and Wren.195 Specifically, Wren suspected that
Washington had shot his brother in May 2004.196 Also, Cynthia
Harris, who was at the steak house when the shooting took place,
told police that she saw Wren with a gun, though she also later
denied this statement at Wren's trial.197 Police never located the
murder weapon198 but they found Wren’s DNA evidence on ciga-
rette butts found in the car that was seen leaving the crime scene and
later abandoned.199
Police apprehended Wren in Chicago on May 3, 2005,200
and during a police interrogation, Wren admitted that he was pres-
ent at the restaurant at the time of the shooting but denied that he
was the shooter.201 During his interrogation, Wren was confronted
with the statements of some of the witnesses, and Wren responded
by saying, “[w]ell those witnesses are just going to have to come to
court.”202 Wren was indicted on two counts of murder and one
count of attempted murder.203 The case was tried a year later and
there was significant pretrial publicity. A newspaper article printed
before voir dire began reported that one of the state’s witnesses,
Teda Ayler, was physically assaulted by her own sister in an attempt
to prevent Ayler from testifying at Wren’s trial.204 There was such
negative publicity and fear of retaliatory gang violence surrounding
the case that the court took the rare step to empanel an anonymous
jury.205 When he was finally tried, the jury convicted Wren of all
three offenses.206
ii. The Prosecutor’s “Different World” Argument
In his closing argument, the prosecutor sought to acknowl-
edge and explain why several of the state’s witnesses seemed reluc-
tant to testify or contradicted their previous statements by remind-
ing the jurors that this incident occurred in North Minneapolis:
This is north Minneapolis. In the juror questionnaires you
were asked - all of you were asked, “Is there a place in 
Minneapolis where you would prefer not to go?” and 
most, if not all of you, said north Minneapolis. Well, this 
is north Minneapolis, folks. This case is north 
Minneapolis.207
Some . . . witnesses show you how fearful they can be to 
come in here and testify on a murder case that happens in
north Minneapolis. You know, Raleigh Robinson and 
Frank Haynes were just having lunch. . . . And so if you 
live in that environment and recognize that you can die 
just because you're having lunch and you're in the wrong 
place at the wrong time, imagine the kinds of feelings 
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and emotions a witness might have when they recognize 
that they have relevant evidence that could convict some
one who's got a lot of buddies out there some of which 
there's evidence were assisting him that day and you have
to go back to that environment.
Some of you who live in places other than north 
Minneapolis indicated in that questionnaire that that's not 
a place you want to go to especially at night. Well, just 
consider what it's like if you live there and you come in 
here and testify and then you have to go back there.  
Recognize that even randomly you could die and you got 
even a better chance of being victimized if you come in 
here and testify and implicate someone who's got buddies
out there that can help him.
So what a surprise would it be that you have people like 
Teda Ayler and even to some extent Cynthia Harris, 
although Cynthia was a little bit more of a jerk than Teda.
But what a surprise is it that you see some of these wit-
nesses come in here reluctantly and demonstrating their 
fear and testifying and in a case like this? Does that sur-
prise you? What does your common sense and reason tell
you about that?208
The prosecutor also suggested that Wren was aware of his ability to
intimidate witnesses when he told police that the witnesses against
him would “just . . . have to come to court.” The prosecutor stated
that this statement suggested a “[l]ittle bit of street knowledge of
this guy knowing how difficult it is for witnesses to come to
court.”209
iii. The Defendant’s Claim and the Result on Appeal
On appeal, Wren alleged that the prosecutor’s references
during closing argument to North Minneapolis constituted miscon-
duct and prejudiced him.210 The court restated its case law in this
area by holding that it is error for a prosecutor to ask jurors to apply
racial and socio-economic considerations but it is not error for a
prosecutor to seek to prepare jurors for evidence of an unfamiliar
world.211With little elaboration on that distinction, the court deter-
mined that the prosecutor’s references to North Minneapolis did not
constitute error because they were brief and were used to explain
inconsistencies in the witnesses’ stories.212 According to the court,
the prosecutor’s argument provided,
context for why witnesses were reluctant to cooperate or 
changed stories between police interviews and grand jury
testimony and trial, specifically because they came from 
a high-crime neighborhood, which may create reluctant 
witnesses. There were no references to the racial or 
socio-economic background of the witnesses or Wren, 
and the prosecutor did not appear to imply that Wren 
should be convicted because he was from this environ-
ment.213
The court’s critique of the prosecutor’s closing argument was not
entirely glowing, however. The court held that the prosecutor’s
reminder to the jurors about what they stated in their questionnaires
was “arguably improper” because it seemed “designed to appeal to
jurors’ prejudices and it goes beyond the evidence.”214 Ultimately,
however, the court found that, though the argument might have
been improper, it was not plain error because the reference to the
questionnaires,
while perhaps taking the jury momentarily away from the
evidence, was made within the context of attempting to 
explain the shifting stories of one of the state's witnesses, 
D.B. The comment was not directed at the defendant and 
it was not made in an effort to get the jury to align them
selves with the state and against the defendant. . . . 
Finally, Wren cites no case, rule, or standard of conduct 
that he claims was contravened by the prosecutor's refer-
ence to the jurors' answers to the questionnaire. 
Accordingly, on this record we hold that the comment, 
while improper, does not rise to the level of plain error.215
Anatomy of the “Different World” Argument
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Ray, Clifton, Paul, and
Wren demonstrated a high sensitivity to prosecutors whose argu-
ments address, allude to, or could inspire the jury to consider the
racial or socioeconomic backgrounds of the state’s witnesses.216
However, it is unclear whether the court has accurately interpreted
the prosecutors’ statements.217 To define its concern, the court cre-
ated an apparent test to determine the propriety of a prosecutor’s
comments. The court distinguishes between improperly asking
jurors to apply racial and socioeconomic considerations and prop-
erly preparing jurors for evidence of an unfamiliar world.218 The
court has utilized this test to evaluate a prosecutor’s closing argu-
ment in recent cases.219 When creating this test, the court failed to
consider that the prosecutors’ comments in these cases do not seem
to be aimed at asking jurors to apply prejudicial or demeaning
notions or at trying to prepare them for evidence.  For this reason,
the test seems to be an imprecise tool for evaluating prosecutors’
closing arguments. The prosecutors in these cases seem to strive,
instead, to encourage jurors to recognize potential biases within
themselves and to avoid applying these biases when judging wit-
nesses’ credibility. Therefore, the court’s “Wren-Robinson” test
likely expresses an inaccurate understanding of the “different
world” argument.
The anatomy of the “different world” arguments found in
Ray, Clifton, Paul, and Wren is the same, despite the cases’ diver-
gent fact patterns and emphases.220 Whether stated literally or
impliedly by the prosecutor, the basic argument seems to have four
parts:
• The witnesses and the jurors are from different worlds or cultural
environments, based on information acquired during trial and voir
dire.
• It is fair and reasonably predictable that jurors recognize these dif-
ferences and acknowledge that these differences might cause wit-
nesses to think or act in ways that are different from how the jurors
would want or expect the witnesses to think or act.
• However, these differences also might cause jurors to harbor
unfair negative prejudices about the witnesses, especially because
of the witnesses’ perceived race, socioeconomic condition, or social
environment.
• To do justice and to be fair to the witnesses, the jurors should not
base their credibility determinations on unfair prejudicial general-
izations.
This logic is present in each case.  In Ray, the prosecutor
sought to acknowledge and explain why witnesses were not more
forthcoming with information about the murder.  He did this by con-
trasting the western suburbs of Minneapolis, which are well known
to have less crime and poverty,221 with North Minneapolis.
The prosecutor then asked the jurors to “not judge the witnesses
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because they are the product of [North Minneapolis . . . but to]
judge their testimony in spite of the fact that they come from [North
Minneapolis].”222 He asked the jurors to give the witnesses the
respect that they deserve by telling jurors to “remove [themselves]
from [their] environment and look at this case and these witnesses
in the context of the environment that they come from.”223 He
asked them to avoid dismissing the witnesses simply because they
are from North Minneapolis and, instead, to treat the witnesses just-
ly.224 The apparently fatal flaw in the prosecutor’s argument is that
he identified the defendant and several witnesses as “three young
black males in the hood in North Minneapolis.”225 The perceived
impact of this description compels an uncomfortable question about
why the prosecutor’s reference to the defendant and witnesses as
black is capable of opening up floodgates of prejudice.226
In Clifton, the prosecutor acknowledged that the witnesses
came from a “different world” but explained that, under the law,
everyone must be treated equally and everyone is entitled to credi-
bility determinations free from implicit bias.227 She emphasized that
these differences should not weigh on credibility determinations
and asked the jury to give the state’s witnesses “the same consider-
ation as any other people.”228 She added, “we are all members of
the same community. We live in the same area, we have the same
laws, we have the same courts, they are a part of us, and we are a
part of them.”229
In Paul, the prosecutor acknowledged that the witnesses
came from a different world than the jurors.  He also acknowledged
that the conditions of their environment might influence the way
they think and their interest in, or fear of, cooperating with the
police.230 Yet, the prosecutor then asked the jurors to grant the wit-
nesses some respect, since, regardless of their different lifestyles,
the witnesses came to court and told them what they saw happen.231
In Wren, the prosecutor explained that the witnesses came
from North Minneapolis, which he learned during voir dire is a
place that the jurors feared.232 He then sought to explain that the
witnesses from this part of the city may be reluctant to testify
because they have a very natural fear of being hurt.233 He then
asked the jurors to evaluate the testimony of the witnesses using
common sense and reason.234 Rather than criticizing the residents
of North Minneapolis, the prosecutor appears to have invited the
jurors to respect and appreciate the witnesses and to consider
whether the witnesses’ otherwise questionable actions were reason-
able under the circumstances.235
The court’s assessment of “different world” arguments
suggests an obvious aversion to arguments that touch on issues of
race and socioeconomic status.236 The court found either impropri-
eties or “arguable” improprieties in each case, leading the court to
see purposeful race-baiting, intentional denigration of North
Minneapolis residents, and attempts by the prosecutor to align her-
self with the jurors.237 While a prosecutor who paints demeaning,
racially-based imagery of a community should be criticized, is it
appropriate to suggest that virtually any acknowledgement of or
allusion to cultural differences is tantamount to error? Another read-
ing of the arguments in each case seems to reveal different, more
legitimate intentions.
In each of these cases, it should matter to the court that the
jurors likely had a well-developed set of assumptions about North
Minneapolis before the trial started and were exercising and testing
these assumptions throughout the trial. The jurors’ assumptions
could harm either the state or the defendant, however, no worthy
prosecutor would seek to capitalize on or benefit from the jurors’
prejudices because such conduct would be both wrong and a recipe
for a mistrial.238 Instead, the harm that results from the jurors’ prej-
udices is likely to come from the jurors directly, who may apply
these biases against the witnesses or the victim with or without any
prompting by the defense attorney. As an officer of the court and
minister of justice, a reasonable prosecutor would harbor concerns
about this implicit bias and would be wise to try to immunize jurors
from their own unconscious prejudice.
Racism is a difficult subject to address, especially in open
court.  However, it is reasonable that, when a case may be decided
on witness credibility, the prosecutor will seize the opportunity to
tell the jury which facts are important to consider when making
credibility determinations and which facts are not important.
Factors such as the race, education level, language skills, and
socioeconomic status of the residents of North Minneapolis are not
appropriate measures of witness believability.  Discussing the gen-
eral prejudices faced by a particular segment of society, especially
when the jurors themselves confess to harboring such prejudices
during voir dire, does not indicate an effort to unfairly prejudice the
defendant.  More likely, it is an effort to even the playing field, to
ensure that the case will be decided on the evidence, not on unfair
generalizations about the sources of the evidence.  Both sides –
prosecution and defense – should have an opportunity to argue to
jurors that a witness’s cultural background should not disqualify
him or her as a credible witness. This opportunity may come only
after the court reexamines the anatomy and purpose of the “differ-
ent world” argument.
The Court’s Misreading of the Arguments
In Ray, Clifton, Paul, and Wren, the court is clearly con-
cerned that the prosecutor will prejudice the defendant by fostering
negative racial and socioeconomic stereotypes.  However, is the
court exercising this concern appropriately?  Is the court’s desire to
prevent racial animus – a laudable goal in any context – preventing
legitimate arguments about the trial evidence and witness credibili-
ty?
In a typical trial, jurors are never told to remove their bias-
es.  For example, the standard jury instruction regarding witness
credibility does not tell jurors that they are prohibited from taking
into account a witness’s race, (perceived) socioeconomic back-
ground, or (imagined) life experience when judging the witness’s
credibility.239 In fact, the instruction that jurors do hear is open-
ended and informs them that they may take into considerations “any
. . .  factors that bear on believability and weight.”240
This is surprising, considering the concern expressed by the bench
regarding eliminating prejudice. What fail-safe exists to ensure that
this open-ended instruction is not a license for jurors to embrace
their prejudices? The prosecutor’s and defendant’s closing argu-
ments could provide that insurance.
The court is cognizant that jurors are capable of applying
racial and socioeconomic stereotypes on their own without any
reminder or urging from the prosecutor.241 Thus, it is inconsistent
for the court to neglect to attempt to root out the maladies it is con-
cerned with in Ray, Clifton, Paul, and Wren.  Further, the court
inhibits attorneys from dealing with these problems.  It expresses
discomfort with any argument by an attorney that raises concerns
about racial stereotypes.  It is as if the court fears that the mere men-
tion of race will tip the scales of justice against the defendant by
suggesting to jurors that they should be biased.  In this way the
court responds ineffectively to issues of racial and socioeconomic
diversity within the courtroom, and ignores the current sociological
thinking about the cultural biases that ordinary well-meaning jurors
may harbor about the state’s civilian witnesses.242
The “different world” rhetorical device requires that the
prosecutor acknowledge jurors’ potential for discriminating against
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witnesses based on their differences. There is no way around this.
To talk about something, one typically must bring it out into the
open.  By doing this, the prosecutor obviously may have to inject
cultural considerations into the court record, but it is naïve to think
that this would be the first time the jurors had injected such consid-
erations into their own reaction to the case.243 It would be difficult
to argue that these considerations were not present in the jury box
throughout the trial, tacit but pervasive.244 Mainstream sociologi-
cal research confirms that people are constantly making racial and
socioeconomic judgments – often immediately and unconsciously –
when interacting with others.245 The court’s opinions in Ray,
Clifton, Paul, and Wren suggest that the court might be more com-
fortable if attorneys remained mute about the realities of human
nature and American culture for the benefit of keeping the record
clean.246 In our current historical reality, it would be unwise to fail
to deal with the jurors’ potential for bias in a sophisticated way.247
The jurors’ world is far larger than the one defined by the four cor-
ners of a trial transcript, and attorneys need freedom to deal with the
harms from this world that might invade the trial process.
Surely, the court would not prefer that jurors tacitly apply
racial and socioeconomic stereotypes when evaluating witness tes-
timony to a situation in which these potential stereotypes are
brought out in the open and dismissed as inappropriate.  Recent
research reveals that jurors are better able to act without bias if they
are made aware of their potential for race bias.248 Indeed, respond-
ing to this and other research, judges in California are now taught
that the best way to avoid unintended biases within themselves is to
make themselves conscious of racial differences between them-
selves and litigants.249 The California Benchguide on Self-
Represented Litigants advises judges to make themselves conscious
of racial differences because “we are acutely aware of differences
whether or not we consciously acknowledge them, and we are more
likely to make judgments based on implicit biases related to those
differences if we attempt to ignore them.”250 The California court
should be commended for exercising such wise self-awareness.
Yet, despite the increased academic and public awareness
of implicit biases,251 the Minnesota Supreme Court has been slow
to consider the possibility that prosecutors are making “different
world” arguments for appropriate reasons.252 Without a clearer
understanding of the court’s fears and boundaries, the court may
prevent attorneys from vigorously arguing credibility in their clos-
ing arguments, and this would be unfair to the parties and to wit-
nesses.  By thwarting prosecutorial discretion in such an overt man-
ner, the court not only prevents the state from doing its job, but also
prevents an exploration and inoculation of cultural prejudice in this
crucial civic venue.
Identifying a Genuine Concern about Inspiring Cultural Prejudice
Perhaps the best way to try to understand the court’s per-
spective is to look at a case in which a prosecutor overstepped her
bounds when referencing race and socioeconomic considerations.
The best candidate is State v. Mayhorn, a 2006 case involving a
murder that took place in Moorhead, Clay County, Minnesota.253
Here, again the court encountered a prosecutor who suggested that
the defendant was from a different world from her and the jurors.
However, in doing so, she utilized strong moral and racial over-
tones.254 The prosecutor’s remarks in Mayhorn demonstrates that
the genuine concern of the court should be whether, in making
racially-based arguments, the prosecutor is attempting to align her-
self with the jurors against the defendant.
The facts of Mayhorn are relatively straightforward.255
On August 29, 2003, shortly before 2:20 p.m., Nasean Jordan and
Janney Garcia were shot in an apartment in Moorhead, Minnesota,
and Jordan died.256 Investigators determined that Troy Mayhorn
masterminded the shooting, though he did not actually shoot
Jordan.257 Police suspected that the motive was drug-related.258
Mayhorn was tried for the murder, and two of his accomplices tes-
tified against him.259 Mayhorn testified in his own defense and
claimed that he was not part of any conspiracy and that he was in
the Twin Cities when the murder took place.260 After a three-week
trial, the jury found Mayhorn guilty of aiding and abetting first-
degree premeditated murder.261
On appeal, Mayhorn argued that the prosecutor committed
misconduct when she cross-examined him about why he gave
money for funeral flowers to Jordan's girlfriend, rather than to
Jordan’s sister.262 When she asked about the flowers, he said, “I
mean – you would have to understand the relationships between the
people we’re talking about.” The prosecutor abruptly responded, “I
would have to understand that. This is kind of foreign for all of us,
I believe, because we're not really accustomed to this drug world
and drug dealing.”263 The defendant’s attorney objected to this non
sequitur, and the trial court sustained the objection.264 Mayhorn
argued on appeal that the prosecutor “used the word ‘we’ to align
herself with the jury and to exaggerate the difference between
Mayhorn and herself and the jurors.”265 Mayhorn also argued that,
“[b]y describing Mayhorn’s ‘world’ as something ‘foreign’ that nei-
ther she nor the jurors were ‘accustomed to,’ the prosecutor invoked
impermissible racial and socioeconomic considerations.”266
On review, the court noted that prosecutors generally are
permitted to describe a defendant as not being from the same world
as the jurors when “these comments [do] little more than prepare the
jury for evidence of an unfamiliar world involving drugs.”267
However, the court stated, that “it is improper for a prosecutor to
highlight the defendant’s racial or socioeconomic status as a way to
put evidence in context.”268 The court cited Ray for this proposition
but only stated that Ray stood for the notion that “prosecutors
should avoid inviting jurors to apply racial and socio-economic
considerations.”269 The court further analyzed the prosecutor’s
remark by noting, that “there may have been [other] instances in
this trial in which the state attempted to highlight cultural differ-
ences between the predominantly white jury and the defendant.”270
The court held that the prosecutor committed misconduct
because the prosecutor “aligned herself with the jury.”271 The error
occurred because the prosecutor “describe[d] herself and the jury as
a group of which the defendant is not a part.”272The court explained
that, “[o]n a more basic level, a prosecutor is not a member of the
jury, so to use ‘we’ and ‘us’ is inappropriate and may be an effort to
appeal to the jury’s passions.”273 The conviction was ultimately
reversed.274
Upon review of the court’s justifiable concern for the
rights of the defendant in Mayhorn, he court’s concerns in Ray,
Clifton, Paul, and Wren become clearer.  In just one flippant retort,
the prosecutor in Mayhorn revealed herself as someone willing to
belittle the defendant and distinguish the defendant from the com-
munity of jurors.  Such statements aim to draw a wedge between the
defendant and the jurors and prevent the defendant from being seen
as someone from the community.  Such intentions are unfair,
because they aim to deprive the defendant of a fundamental right;
the right to a jury trial in which the members of the defendant’s own
community are the finders of fact.  However, Mayhorm can be dis-
tinguished from Ray, Clifton, Paul, and Wren. The tone and purpose
of the improper comment in Mayhorn varies from those made in the
other four cases, and the attorney’s comment in Mayhorm is
arguably indefensible.  Not even an ardent defense-oriented person
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could equate that prosecutor’s words in Mayhorn with the argu-
ments found in Ray, Clifton, Paul and Wren. Unlike the prosecutor
in Mayhorn, none of the prosecutors in Ray, Clifton, Paul, or Wren
attempted to encourage the jury to apply negative cultural stereo-
types about the defendant or any of the witnesses, and none were
trying to align themselves with the jury.  None seemed eager to
“highlight the defendant’s racial or socioeconomic status as a way
to put evidence in context.”275 At most, the prosecutors’ arguments
could be criticized for referring to matters not in evidence, but this
pales in comparison to the conduct in Mayhorn.
So, is it possible that the court is misreading the arguments
in Ray, Clifton, Paul, and Wren?  If so, what may be impeding the
court from appreciating the posture and purpose of these argu-
ments?
Prosecutorial Error and the Court’s Trust
It is revealing that the court in Mayhorn characterized Ray
as standing for the notion that “prosecutors should avoid inviting
jurors to apply racial and socio-economic considerations.”   If that
is the rule to draw from Ray, Clifton, Paul, or Wren, then perhaps all
that needs to happen is for the court to be persuaded to believe that
this is truly not the intent or effect of the prosecutors’ arguments.
Consequently, the determination of propriety in these cases
becomes almost an issue more of trust in the intent of the prosecu-
tors than an issue of law.  Can the court trust that the prosecutors in
these cases had proper intentions?  Can the court trust the defense
attorney would have objected if the comments were truly objection-
able?  Can the court trust that the trial judge would have stopped the
prosecutor if the comments were improper?
Over the past decade, the court has shown less trust in the
sincerity of prosecutors and their ability to fulfill their roles as “offi-
cer[s] of the court” and “minister[s] of justice.”277 In some cases,
the court’s attitude has approached near hostility toward prosecu-
tors. The court in State v. Ramey, for example, modified the impor-
tant “plain error test” when reviewing instances of prosecutorial
error in order to “put the onus on the prosecutor” and remind pros-
ecutors that “[r]educing the incidence of prosecutorial misconduct
is [their] shared obligation.”278 At this time, Minnesota appears to
be the only jurisdiction in the country to have modified plain error
review specifically to more closely scrutinize prosecutors.279
Ultimately, according to the court, such pressure is intended to curb
what the court saw as prosecutors’ unrelenting engagement in
“clearly prohibited conduct” in the face of decades of judicial effort
to prevent such injustice.280 The court decided it was necessary to
place a greater burden on prosecutors to be aware of and comply
with case law that outlines the rules that guarantee defendants a fair
trial.281
Recently, the court has been primed to find excesses in
prosecutors’ closing arguments. The court in Ramey outlined a list
of eight types of improper conduct that the court has found in pros-
ecutor’s closing arguments since 1984.284 According to the court:
Some examples are: eliciting inadmissible evidence; 
alluding in argument to the defendant’s exercise of the 
right not to testify, or to the defendant’s failure to call 
witnesses; misstating the presumption of innocence, or 
the burden of proof; interjecting the prosecutor’s personal
opinion about the veracity of witnesses; inflaming the 
passions and prejudices of the jury; disparaging the 
defendant’s defense to the charges; and injecting race into
the case when race is not relevant.283
The attitude of the court is revealed by its willingness to address a
single prosecutor’s argument by reciting a laundry list of other
errors that that prosecutor did not commit.  It is within this context
that the court interpreted the prosecutors’ arguments in Ray, Clifton,
Paul, and Wren.  In this context, it is understandable that the court
would misinterpret the “different world” argument. The court sim-
ply may have assumed that the prosecutors had improper motives.
Though the court did not reverse the convictions in all of
these cases, it spoke negatively of each of the prosecutors’ remarks
in Ray, Clifton, Paul, and Wren.  By doing so, the court seems to
have unfairly equated clearly improper Mayhorn-like comments
with the type of oral advocacy seen in these other cases.  Even in
cases where the court tried to be sympathetic to prosecutors, the
court’s tone reveals an extreme reluctance to tolerate the prosecutor
talking about differences between the witnesses and jurors.  For
example, in Paul, the court noted with sincerity: 
Although we find no error here, we take this opportunity 
to remind attorneys and district courts of the concerns we
raised in Clifton and Ray, and encourage attorneys to 
refrain from using concepts and terms such as different 
“worlds” or “these people” to refer to the people inti-
mately involved in the case. Such imagery may imply 
that the people involved with the case are somehow col-
lectively distinguishable from the jurors on an inappropri-
ate basis. If an attorney intends to convey that certain 
witnesses are credible despite behaving in a way that a 
juror might not understand, we respectfully suggest that 
there are other, more appropriate ways to address this 
concern. Finally, we reaffirm our “strong commitment to 
rooting out bias, no matter how subtle,” and invite all 
attorneys participating in the criminal justice system to 
join this effort.284
The court’s goals are admirable, but, by overlooking that prosecu-
tors’ goals are also admirable, the court expresses unwarranted
doubts about prosecutors’ ability to follow their duties when speak-
ing to jurors.
If a prosecutor inserts racially-based arguments into the
trial, he is most likely not the first person to acknowledge the cul-
tural and racial distinctions between jurors and the witnesses, e.g.
that some of the witnesses are African-American or from North
Minneapolis and that some of the jurors are not.
These differences would become clear during voir dire and during
the trial to just about any juror.285 Clearly, these differences were
obvious to the jurors in Wren, and the prosecutor merely admon-
ished the jury about applying common stereotypes to witnesses
from North Minneapolis. The prosecutor did not attempt to align
himself with the jury, nor did he attempt to create a conflict between
the defendant and the jurors; he appeared to be asking the jurors to
respect the witnesses.
What does it look when a prosecutor tries to align himself
with the jury?  It looks a lot different from the arguments made in
Ray, Clifton, Paul, and Wren. There are a number of cases from
Minnesota that demonstrate improper alignment.  In State v. Perry,
the prosecutor told the jury that “none of us are safe” unless the jury
convicted the defendant.286 In State v. Schabert, the prosecutor
expressed a similar sentiment, when he stated that, if the defendant
is released, “just as surely as she has killed her husband in cold
blood, that same thing will happen to her son, or someone else . . .
.” 287 In State v. Jones, the prosecutor attempted to convince jurors
that they entered into a “pact” to convict the defendant.288 In State
v. Haney, the prosecutor tried to convince jurors that they were in a
partnership with the sheriff and county attorney as part of “your law
enforcement machinery.”289 Lastly, in State v. Clark, a case from
rural Martin County, the prosecutor aligned himself with the jury to
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the detriment of “the great criminal lawyer from Minneapolis,”290
who has denigrated and mocked as a poseur and part of the myste-
rious “society of criminality.”   In these cases, the error is clear
because the prosecutor’s attempt to align himself with the jury is
obvious and deliberately prejudicial to the defendant.
The “different world” argument seems to pale in compari-
son to these clearly improper remarks. The arguments cannot be
analogized to each other, and they clearly do not serve the same pur-
poses. Yet, perhaps, this is what the court is struggling to parse out.
It must recognize that an attorney can discuss the inhabitants of
North Minneapolis in a way that promotes justice and fairness
rather than promotes racial stereotyping.
Despite the court’s concerns about the improper motives of
prosecutors, the case law gives prosecutors great leeway during
closing argument. A prosecutor is not required to make a “colorless
argument” and has the right to present “all legitimate arguments on
the evidence, to analyze and present all proper inferences to be
drawn therefrom.”291 The prosecutor “may state conclusions and
inferences [that] the human mind may reasonably draw from the
facts in evidence,”292 and the prosecutor has the right to argue that
a state’s witness is worthy of credibility based on the prosecutor’s
analysis of the evidence.293 Furthermore, the prosecutor is fully
entitled to anticipate that the defendant’s attorney intends to attack
the credibility of the state’s witnesses in his closing argument.294
Within this context, during closing argument a prosecutor
should be permitted to acknowledge cultural differences that exist
between civilian witnesses and the jurors for the purpose of arguing
that, despite those differences, the witnesses are worthy of credibil-
ity.  Granted, it is clear that these arguments, in the hands of a tact-
less and careless prosecutor, could prejudice the defendant.
However, this is equally true of arguments about the burden of
proof, intent, and Spreigl evidence.  Of course, no one should be
permitted to be ham-handed when addressing cultural differences
among people, but the possibility of improper misstatements should
not prevent an attorney from making legitimate, proper arguments.
The key for the court is to recognize the propriety of the argument
generally, and then, if an attorney commits any prejudicial error
while making the argument, the court can correct the conduct and
admonish the attorney.  
For example, when making a “different world” argument,
there are two obvious errors that prosecutors must avoid: (1) refer-
ring to evidence outside the record; and (2) making negative insin-
uations about the defendant’s character. These two errors are what
the court should be policing.
Referring to Evidence Outside the Record
A clear concern surrounding “different world” arguments
should be whether the prosecutor is referring to evidence that is not
in the record, which is improper.  If the prosecutor intends to dis-
cuss generally the backgrounds of the witnesses, the prosecutor
must make sure that she lays the foundation for these arguments
during direct examination. The prosecutor would err if she intro-
duced cultural stereotypes that had no connection to the facts of the
case.  For example, if she is going to describe a typical day in the
life of the witnesses, she should make sure that the witnesses testi-
fy about this, as was done in Clifton.295 Furthermore, if the prose-
cutor intends to contrast the witnesses with the jurors, the prosecu-
tor should recall only direct statements made during voir dire.296
There would be a great threat of error if the prosecutor began an
argument by stating, “During jury selection, you seemed . . . .”  By
speculating the prosecutor would not only be discussing evidence
not in the record, but would be injecting her own opinion into clos-
ing argument. The court should wary of these arguments while still
permitting prosecutors to make legitimate arguments in support of
witness credibility.
Making Negative Insinuations about the Defendant’s Character
A second concern about “different world” arguments
should be whether the prosecutor’s comments have negative impli-
cations about the defendant’s character.  For example, it would be
error for a prosecutor to state that a witness is courageous for testi-
fying despite the dangers of retaliatory violence if there is no evi-
dentiary basis for suspecting the defendant of such misconduct.
This remark improperly suggests that the defendant is dangerous,
which would prejudice the defendant.  If a prosecutor implied that
everyone in North Minneapolis is a gang member or drug user, this
clearly would improperly implicate the defendant in illegal activity.
This type of comment might prompt jurors to make generalizations
about the defendant based on his environment. Although it should
not be improper to, at least, acknowledge that the defendant is from
the same community as the witnesses,297 it clearly would be
improper if the prosecutor used the defendant’s community affilia-
tion to demonize the defendant or align the prosecutor with the
jurors, who are foreign to that community, against the defendant.
This would be as egregious as the prosecutor’s statement in
Mayhorn. The court can police these potential errors but still permit
the prosecutor to make legitimate arguments that serve to thwart
jurors from making negative generalizations about the state’s wit-
nesses.
This article was written at a time when the nation may be
beginning to talk about issues of race and socioeconomic disparity
in an entirely new way, best evinced by then Senator Barack
Obama’s well-publicized March 18, 2008 speech.298 This “new
way,” as characterized by Mr. Obama’s speech299 and by the soci-
ological research into people’s implicit and unintended cultural
biases,300 acknowledges that racial prejudice is still pervasive in
American culture and affirms that ignoring the fact that even well-
meaning individuals are capable of bias only perpetuates society’s
problems. This newfound openness to discussing tacit prejudice
flies in the face of those who believe that “racism” is only some-
thing that occurs aloud in public.  It addresses the need to combat
covert racism as ardently as overt racism.301
This article argues that the court should consider whether
the court’s opinions in Ray, Clifton, Paul and Wren are a part of an
antiquated way of thinking about how racial and cultural prejudice
plays a role in a criminal trial. The prosecutors in these cases spoke
to the jurors about the tangible cultural differences between the
jurors and the state’s witnesses; they did so by acknowledging that
the jurors and the witnesses came from “different worlds.”  In doing
so, the prosecutors seemed intent on bringing out these differences
to force jurors to check their prejudices and to judge the credibility
of the witnesses based on the evidence. The prosecutors’’ argu-
ments, labeled in this article  “different world” arguments, are a
rhetorical device that directs jurors to identify and then discard their
fears, prejudices, and possible indifference toward people from
communities like North Minneapolis.  In these arguments, the pros-
ecutors most likely did not inject cultural concerns and judgments
into these trials by talking about the “different world” from which
some of the state’s witnesses came because these concerns and
judgments already were present in the jurors’ minds.  Instead, these
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prosecutors seemed to argue that, despite the jurors predictable ten-
dencies to make generalizations about the witnesses, the witnesses
were worthy of the jurors’ trust.
The template suggested by these arguments seems proper
and should be permitted by the court. Admittedly, a prosecutor mak-
ing such an argument faces the danger of misspeaking about the
defendant’s community and prejudicing the defendant, and it still is
wise for prosecutor’s to avoid addressing irrelevant racial consider-
ations.  However, if the court defines the proper parameters of the
“different world” argument, an attorney would know what he can
and cannot say.  Likewise, a prosecutor, as a minister of justice, can
be trusted to follow the parameters set out by the court.  In the
future, the court should review its holdings in Ray, Clifton, Paul and
Wren and give attorneys the freedom to make these arguments when
they are appropriate.
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Think of the North Side of Minneapolis and what comes to mind?  Crime and 
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looking for him regarding the regarding the shooting. Id.
201  Id.
202  Appellant’s Brief at *28, State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378 (Minn. 2007) (No. A06-1283),
2006 WL 4847508 (emphasis added).
203  Wren, 738 N.W.2d at 385.
204 Id. at 385-86.
205 Id. at 386.
206 Id. at 385. “The jury found Wren guilty of the premeditated murders of Haynes and
Robinson in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.185(a)(1) and 609.11 (2006), and guilty of the
attempted murder of Washington in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.185(a)(1), 609.11, and
609.17 (2006).”  Id.
207  Appellant’s Brief at *27, State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378 (Minn. 2007) (No. A06-1283)
(citing the court transcript). The actual question on the juror questionnaire was, “Are there
areas in the City of Minneapolis that you might refuse or be afraid to go into during certain
times of the day?”  Wren, 738 N.W.2d at 393 n.12.
208  Appellant’s Brief at *28, Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378 (No. A06-1283) (citing the court tran-
script).
209 Id. (citing the court transcript).
210  State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378, 392 (Minn. 2007).
211  Id. (juxtaposing State v. Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736, 747 (Minn.2003) and State v. Robinson,
604 N.W.2d 355, 363 (Minn.2000)).
212  Id.
213 Id.
214  Id.
215 Id. at 393.  D.B. was a witness who testified that he saw Wren enter and leave the steak
house. Id. at 384.
216  See supra Part IV.
217  Even in Paul and Wren, where the court seemed to show increased receptivity to the “dif-
ferent world” arguments, the court is unwilling to appreciate why the prosecutor felt it was
necessary to raise the arguments, to introduce the known biases against North Minneapolis, and
clear the air about the jurors’ potential for prejudice.  See supra Part IV.
218   See, e.g., State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378, 392 (Minn. 2007) (juxtaposing State v. Ray,
659 N.W.2d 736, 747 (Minn.2003) and State v. Robinson, 604 N.W.2d 355, 363 (Minn.2000)).
219  See id.
220 See supra Part IV (describing the prosecutor’s arguments in Ray, Clifton, Paul, and
Wren).
221  See supra Part III.
222  Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 746 (emphasis added).
223  Id.
224  Respondent’s Brief at *15-16, State v. Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 2003) (No. C0-00-
228), 2002 WL 32704692
225  Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 746.
226  The court suggests in Paul and Clifton that a large reason why it refrained from reversing
these cases is that the prosecutor did not explicitly mention race.  Though any experienced trial
lawyer is aware that issues of race are discussed at length and in straightforward terms by both
parties during voir dire, it appears that the court has strongly resisted any reference to the
defendant’s race during closing argument unless race is particularly relevant to the facts of the
case.  Granted, racial prejudice is a powerful force still today in American society; however, is
it the type of force that is summoned by and only by the explicit mentioning of race?  Is it the
type of force that is kept in check by and only by a moratorium on references to the race of the
defendant or witnesses during closing argument?
227  State v. Clifton, 701 N.W.2d 793, 799-800 (Minn. 2005).
228  Respondent’s Brief at *19-20, State v. Clifton, 719 N.W.2d 793, (2005) (No. A03-1964),
2005 WL 2213961 (quoting trial transcript).
229  Id.
230  State v. Paul, 716 N.W.2d 329, 339-40 (Minn. 2006).
231  Id.
232  Appellant’s Brief at *28, State v. Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 2003) (No. C0-00-228),
2002 WL 32704690 (citing the court transcript).
233  Id.
234 Id.
235  Id.
236  Wren may be an exception to this because the court apparently caught on to the prosecu-
tor’s argument.  Yet, the court still introduced and discussed the Ray-Robinson test without
showing any greater appreciation for the line of cases that includes Ray, Clifton, and Paul.
237 See supra Part IV.
238 But see State v. Jackson, 714 N.W.2d 681, 693-95 (Minn. 2006) (permitting the prosecutor
to talk about the racial background of the murder victim and witnesses when the issue of race
was deeply relevant to the motivations of the defendant and the witnesses).
239  See 10 MINNESOTA PRACTICE, JURY INSTRUCTIONS GUIDES - CRIMINAL 3.12
(5th ed. 2006)
240 Id.  Specifically, the instruction tells jurors that, when determining whether a witness is
credible, they may consider (1) interest or lack of interest in the outcome of the case; (2) rela-
tionship to the parties; (3) ability and opportunity to know, remember, and relate the facts; (4)
manner; (5) age and experience; (6) frankness and sincerity or lack thereof; (7) reasonableness
of their testimony in light of all the other evidence in the case; (8) any impeachment of the wit-
ness’s testimony; and (9) any other factors that bear on believability and weight.  Id.
241  See, e.g., Varner, 643 N.W.2d at 302 (reversing a conviction after one juror made a racial-
ly biased comment to other jurors, stating that an area of St. Paul was a "miracle mile"
because, if a white person walked down the street and did not get beaten or robbed, it was a
miracle).
242  See infra notes 244-50.
243 Id.
244  See Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345 (2007); Robert G. Schwenn, Why Do Landlords Still
Discriminate (and What Can Be Done About It)?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 455, 500-507
(2007) (reviewing the academic literature related to the psychological studies of implicit bias
and their legal implications).
245  See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination
Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 477 (2007); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 1489 (2005); Ian Ayres, Pervasive Prejudice? Unconventional Evidence of Race and
Gender Discrimination, in STUDIES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (William M. Landes & J.
Mark Ramseyer eds., 2001); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1161 (1995); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).  For a nonacademic summary of the
field of “implicit social cognition,” see, for example, MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK 77-
83 (2005); Teaching Tolerance, Hidden Bias: A Primer,
http://www.tolerance.org/hidden_bias/tutorials/02.html (last visited Jan. 20,2009) [hereinafter
Teaching Tolerance]  For an extensive bibliography related to implicit social cognition, see
Project Implicit, Bibliography,
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/background/bibliography.html [hereinafter Project
Implicit, Bibliography], and Project Implicit, Articles,
http://www.projectimplicit.net/articles.php (last visited Jan. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Project
Implicit, Articles]
246  See supra Part IV.  In both Paul and Clifton, it appears that the court’s decision to not
reverse the defendant’s conviction was based on the fact that the prosecutor did not mention
race explicitly, in contrast to the prosecutor in Ray.
247 See Levinson, supra note 244.  Even the National Basketball Association has recently con-
fronted the notion that its referees are subject to racial bias in the calling of fouls.  See Joseph
Price & Justin Wolfers, Racial Discrimination Among &BA Referees (NBER Working Paper
No. 13206, June 2007), available at
http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/Papers/NBARace.pdf (finding racial bias in NBA refer-
ees); see also Alan Schwarz, Study of &.B.A. Sees Racial Bias in Calling Fouls, N.Y. TIMES,
May 2, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/02/sports/basketball/02refs.html
(discussing league and player reaction to the study).
248  Samuel R. Sommers and Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of
Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y
& L. 201–229 (2001) (indicating that, once a defendant’s race in a jury simulation is explicitly
referred to and jurors are made aware of the potential for their race bias, they are better able to
correct for it).
249  Avoiding Unintended Bias, California Benchguide on Self-Represented Litigants, Ch. 10,
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/equalaccess/documents/selfrep07/Decisionmaking/C
hapter10.pdf (2007) (prepared for the 2007 California Conference on Self-Represented
Litigants).
250 Id.
251  See supra notes 244 -50 and accompanying text.
252   See, e.g., Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 746-47.  In Ray, the court identified the prosecutor and
noted that Ray was the prosecutor’s third separate appellate challenge for statements that he
made in closing argument that highlighted the fact that the defendant came from a “different
world” than the jurors.  See also State v. Robinson, 604 N.W.2d 355, 362-63 (2000); State v.
Brown, No. C7-99-1711, 2000 WL 978756, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 18, 2000).  In Ray, the
state argued that the prosecutor’s statements were “merely designed to forestall attacks by
Ray’s counsel on the credibility of the state’s witnesses;” however, instead of disagreeing with
the state or even addressing the state’s argument, the court seems more intent on expressing
annoyance and scolding the prosecutor for making an argument that had been challenged
before:
The state's position would be stronger if the same prosecutor had not previously 
faced similar challenges, both before this court and the court of appeals. In 
[Robinson], the defendant argued that there was prosecutorial misconduct in clos-
ng argument when the prosecutor reminded jurors that the defendant's world was 
different from that of a “businessman from Edina, Pope John Paul, and Mother 
Teresa.” We found no misconduct because the comments were isolated and were 
appropriate to inform the jury about unfamiliar aspects of the drug culture. But in 
[Brown], the same prosecutor compared a Minneapolis minority community 
unfovorably to the world of Mother Teresa or Pope John Paul. The court of 
appeals determined that these statements “rose to the level of misconduct” and 
reversed the conviction.
Id. at 746-747.  By identifying this specific prosecutor, the court seems to have been attempt-
ing to imply that the same prosecutor had made the improper argument in Ray after being
warned twice by the appellate courts to avoid the rhetorical device. See Ray, 659 N.W.2d at
746-47; see also Beth Hawkins, Trial By Color, City Pages, June 4, 2003, available at
http://citypages.com/databank/24/1174/article11286.asp.  A glance at the trial dates in Ray and
Robinson, however, indicates that the trials of the two defendants concluded before any of
these three opinions was released.  See Margaret Zack, St. Paul Man Convicted of Drug-
Related Murder, STAR TRIB., June 19, 1998, at 2B [hereinafter Zack, Drug-Related Murder]
(reporting that Dameion Robinson was convicted of first degree murder during an aggravated
robbery on June 18, 1998); Margaret Zack, 20-Year-Old Guilty of First-Degree Murder, STAR
TRIB., Nov. 11, 1999, at 3B [hereinafter Zack, First-Degree Murder] (reporting that Secundus
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Ray was convicted of aiding and abetting first degree murder on November 10, 1999).  Further,
the court actually found no misconduct in the prosecutor’s statement in Robinson and, in 2007,
used Robinson to exemplify proper prosecutorial conduct.  See State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378,
392 (Minn. 2007) (juxtaposing the proper comments found in Robinson and the improper com-
ments found in Ray).  Thus, based on these three cases, any implication that this particular
prosecutor had been “persist[ing] in clearly proscribed conduct” would be wrong. Id.
253  State v. Mayhorn, 720 N.W.2d 776, 790 (2006) (finding misconduct where prosecutor
included herself with the jury and argued that the drug world was foreign to all of “us” because
such argument “may be an effort to appeal to the jury's passions”).
254  Id. at 789-90.
255  Id. at 780.
256  Id.
257 Id.
258  Id.
259  Id. at 781.
260 Id. at 780.
261 Id.
262  Appellant’s Brief at *41, State v. Mayhorn, 720 N.W.2d 776 (2006) (No. A04-1971), 2005
WL 4797644
263 Id. (emphasis added).
264 Id.
265 Id.
266  Id. (citing State v. Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736, 747 (Minn. 2003)).
267  Mayhorn, 720 N.W.2d at 789 (citing State v. Robinson, 604 N.W.2d 355, 363
(Minn.2000), denial of habeas corpus aff'd by Robinson v. Crist, 278 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 2002)).
268  Id. (citing Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 746-47).
269 Id. (citing Robinson, 604 N.W.2d at 363, denial of habeas corpus aff'd by Robinson v.
Crist, 278 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 2002)).
270  Id.  The court noted that, “at one point during cross-examination, the prosecutor asked
Mayhorn, who is African American, a question about the ‘white girls that you were hanging
around with in Fargo-Moorhead.’” Id.
271 Id. at 790.
272  Id.
273  Mayhorn, 720 N.W.2d at 789.
274 Id. at 792.
275  Id. (citing Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 746-47).  Certainly, the prosecutor in Ray highlighted the
race of the defendant and witnesses.  Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 746.  He then told the jurors to not
judge the witnesses because they come from a particular environment, tried to rebut the possi-
bility that jurors may not care about the people involved in the case because they were from a
different environment, and reminded jurors that they were called to serve to do justice.
Respondent’s Brief at *15-16, Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736 (No. C0-00-228).
276  Id. (citing State v. Robinson, 604 N.W.2d 355, 363 (Minn.2000), denial of habeas corpus
aff'd by Robinson v. Crist, 278 F.3d 862 (8th Cir.2002)).
277  Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at  300; see also State v. Henderson, 620 N.W.2d 688, 701-02 (2001)
(providing prosecutors have an affirmative obligation to ensure that a defendant receives a fair
trial).
278  Id. at 302-03.
279  See generally James A. Morrow & Joshua R. Larson, Without a Doubt, a Sharp and
Radical Departure: The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision to Change Plain Error Review of
Unobjected-to Prosecutorial Error in State v. Ramey, 31 HAMLINE L. REV. 351(2008) (dis-
cussing the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Ramey, which sought to give appellate
courts more power to examine questions of prosecutorial error). 
280  Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 301.
Our new approach of shifting the burden to the prosecution to show lack of preju-
dice in prosecutorial misconduct cases best serves policy concerns.  The benefits 
of this approach are to better allow substantive review of conduct that prosecutors 
should know is clearly forbidden and to put the onus on the prosecution to defend 
against the prejudicial effect of its own misconduct.  A further benefit of this 
approach is to provide more scrutinizing review by the court of appeals, where a 
large majority of prosecutorial misconduct appeals are decided.
Id. at 302. 
281  Id. at 301.
282  Id. at 300.  
283 Id. (citations omitted).
284  State v. Paul, 716 N.W.2d 329, 341 (Minn. 2006) (quoting State v. Cabrera, 700 N.W.2d
469, 475 (2005)).
285  See supra notes 245-251.
286  State v. Perry, 142 N.W.2d 573, 579 (1966).
None of us are safe until we take care of these people who will rob, who kill, mur-
der, steal. . . . You people work.  You work at your jobs.  You raise your family. . . 
Perry - he doesn’t work.  He prowls at night like he was doing - downtown 
drinking from early afternoon until late in the night; carrying this gun; target prac-
ticing in his house. . . . When Arthur Robert Walters was lying on that pavement 
dying . . . [h]e went up to Elmer’s and started to consume some more liquor and 
pursued his particular indulgence at that time.  This is not the class-A citizen who 
is deserving of any consideration from people on the jury. 
Id.
287  State v. Schabert, 15 N.W.2d 585, 589 (1944).
[J]ust as surely as she has killed her husband in cold blood, that same thing will 
happen to her son, or someone else if she is released.  So, ladies and gentlemen, I 
submit to you that we have an additional responsibility in this case, not the usual 
responsibility to save society from this woman, but we have a responsibility to 
that little boy you saw testify in this courtroom, and . . . I feel as I have never felt 
before, that the only way you can adequately discharge that responsibility is to 
find this defendant guilty of murder in the first degree.
Id.
288   State v. Jones, 152 N.W.2d 67, 77-78 (Minn. 1967).
When we talked about your sitting on this case, you remember we made a little 
pact, each one you and I that if the evidence in the case proved the guilt of the 
defendant, that the responsibility of a juror would be to convict. This is the 
responsibility of a juror. This is the only way that crimes can be controlled, for the
protection of the public. The way to stop crime is to convict the persons who com-
mit them and this is the responsibility of the jury. In this case, the evidence is in 
and the evidence clearly shows the guilt of this defendant beyond a reasonable 
doubt on both burglary and aggravated assault.
Id.
289   State v. Haney, 23 N.W.2d 369, 372 (1946).
Remember this, the sheriff and county attorney of this county are only a part of 
your law enforcement machinery.  We can attempt to do our duty as we have done
it in this case, but in the last analysis it is up to you.  There is no two ways about 
that.  The sheriff and I can arrest somebody and bring the evidence into court if it 
is evidence that points to the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt as 
it does in this case, But if you let the defendant go . . . your law enforcement 
machinery is broken down and the sheriff and I can't do anything about it because 
we have to depend upon you to do your duty, and I know you will just as you 
expect the sheriff and I to do our duty, and we have tried to do it in this instance.
Id.
290   State v. Clark, 131 N.W. 369, 370 (Minn. 1911) (emphasis added).
The way these criminal lawyers do, if they can't prove anything direct, they prove 
it by indirection.  I understand that they have a society, a society of criminology, 
where these criminal lawyers get together and hold meetings, and they have mir-
rors where they can look in and see themselves, and how they act and look, and 
there they learn to act and appear and maneuver before the jury, so as to get a ver-
dict of acquittal.  And I understand that our friend (the defendant's attorney), the 
great criminal lawyer from Minneapolis, is a member of that society of criminolo-
gy. . . . Let me tell you, if that scheme had worked, if Clark's money could have 
purchased the possession of that girl, then, indeed, would Canada have been a 
good place. . . . I tried to show who the family of that Brackett girl (one of defen-
dant's witnesses) was, and what it was; but it was excluded. But I hope there is 
some member on this jury that knows the Brackett girls, and what they are, 
because you have a right to take into account your personal knowledge of people.
291  See, e.g., State v. Williams, 586 N.W.2d 123, 127 (Minn. 1998).
292  State v. Gulbrandsen, 57 N.W.2d 419, 422 (Minn. 1953)
293  State v. Googins, 255 N.W.2d 805, 806 (Minn. 1977)
294  See Salitros, 499 N.W.2d at 818. (“prosecutors are, of course, free to make arguments that
reasonably anticipate arguments defense counsel will make in closing argument”).
295 See State v. Clifton, 701 N.W.2d 793, 799-800 (Minn. 2005).
296  See State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378, 393 (Minn. 2007).  One interesting aspect of these
arguments is the court’s apparent tolerance of prosecutors talking about the contents of voir
dire.  Voir dire is quintessentially the process of picking the jurors, but it clearly has become a
tool of both prosecutors and criminal defendants to begin persuading jurors to think favorably
about their case.  In Wren, the court stated that the defendant could cite “no case, rule or stan-
dard of conduct [that] was contravened by the prosecutor’s reference to the jurors’ answers to
the questionnaire [during voir dire].”  Id.
297  See Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 746.
298  Barack H. Obama, A More Perfect Union, Address at the Constitution Center in Phila., Pa.
(March 18, 2008), PA, available at http://my.barackobama.com/page/content/hisownwords; see
also Alec MacGillis & Eli Saslow, Tackling a Sensitive Topic at a Sensitive Moment, for
Disparate Audiences, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2008, at A06, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/18/AR2008031803195.html;
Richard Reeves, Hearing the Obama Speech, Real Clear Politics, Mar. 20, 2008, available at
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/03/hearing_the_obama_speech.html; Eugene
Robinson, Obama’s Road Map on Race, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2008, at A15, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/18/AR2008031802649.html;
Steve Kornacki, Obama Gives a Presidential Speech About Race, N.Y. OBSERVER, Mar. 18,
2008, available at http://www.observer.com/2008/obama-gives-presidential-speech-about-race;
Mike Dorning & Christi Parsons, Obama Speaks Bluntly on Race, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 18, 2008,
available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/politics/chi-031808-obama-race-
speech,1,6483640.story; David Broder, The Real Value of Obama’s Speech, WASH. POST,
Mar. 23, 2008, at B07, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/03/21/AR2008032102554.html; Laurie Goodstein & Neela Banerjee,
Obama’s Talk Fuels Easter Sermons, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008. 
299  See Obama, supra note 298.
300  See supra notes 244-50.
301  See Obama, supra note 298; see also supra notes 244-50.
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